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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw CARRIERS SuPERSEDURE OF STATE REGu:.
LATIONS BY FEDERAL REGULATIONS REGULATION OF HOURS OF SERVICE•
OF MOTOR VEHICULAR DRIVERS EFFECT OF FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER
AcT OF 1935 - Defendant, whose business was chiefly interstate, violated a

statute 1 of New Hampshire which regulated the hours of service of drivers of
certain motor vehicles. The violation occurred after the passage of the Federal
Motor Carrier Act of 1935,2 which, among other things, conferred authority
upon the Interstate Commerce Commission "to establish reasonable requirements with respect to ••• maximum hours of service of employees" of common
and contract carriers by motor vehicle in interstate commerce.8 At the time of
the breach of the state statute, the Interstate Commerce Commission had not
prescribed regulations as to hours of service. Defendant contended that the
Federal Motor Carrier Act superseded the provisions of the state statute, which
regulated hours of service, and that for that reason he was not liable under
the state statute. Held, the Federal Motor Carrier Act had not superseded the
state statute at the date the breach occurred, and therefore defendant was liable
for breach of the state statute. H.P. ·Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S.
79, 59 S. Ct. 438 (1939).
It is elementary that valid federal laws prevail over state laws pertaining
to the same subject matter.4 The difficult problem arises in connection with the
determination of when Congress intended the federal laws or regulations to
.supersede the state laws or regulations. 5 The difficulty arises because Congress
does not expressly state its intention._ The Court is consequently faced with a
problem of construction. In solving the problem the Court generally relies on

N. H. Laws (1933), c. 106, § 8, as amended by c. 169.
49 Stat. L. 543, 49 U. S. C. (Supp. 1938), §§ 301-327.
8 49 Stat. L. 546, § 204 (a) (1) and (5), 49 U. S. C. (Supp. 1938), § 304 (a)
(1) and (5).
4 II Am. Jur. 26, 872 (1937); Northern Pacific Ry. v. Washington, 222 U. S.
370, 32 S. Ct. 160 (1912), noted in IO M1cH. L. REv. 555 (1912).
5 An excellent note dealing with the problem in general appears in 86 UNiv.
PA. L. REv. 532 (1938).
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the statute itself. 6 The results have varied considerably. This is especially true in
cases where, as in the principal case, Congress has merely delegated authority
to an administrative agency to prescribe regulations. Of course, if the federal
administrative agency has published regulations that are actually inconsistent or
coincident with state regulations, the regulations of the federal agency prevail.
In the absence of inconsistent action by the federal agency or even in the complete absence of action by that agency, the Court has held in some cases that the
mere delegation of authority to act was enough to suspend the state regulations.
In other cases, as in the principal case, the mere delegation of authority to act
was not sufficient to suspend the state regulations. Cases falling in the first group
are represented by Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company v.
VVashington 7 and Napier.v. Atlantic Coast Line.8 In the first case it was held
that the Plant Quarantine Act, 9 which vested extensive powers in the Secretary
or Agriculture to control foreign and interstate transportation of infected plants,
prevented a state official from quarantining certain areas in other states and prohibiting importation of alfalfa from those regions. In the second case, it was
held that the vesting of authority in the Interstate Commerce Commission by
Congress, under the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act,1° to regulate generally
the construction of locomotives prevented states from requiring certain safety
appliances to be affixed to locomotives. In both cases the intent of Congress to
supersede the state laws was found in the sweeping scope of the federal statutes.11
Cases coming within the second group are represented by Mintz v. Baldwin 12
and Missouri Pacific Railway v. Larabee Flour Mills. 16 In Mintz v. Baldwin
the broad powers of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Cattle Contagious
Diseases Act 14 were insufficient to prevent a state from requiring, as a condition
to importation in the state, inspection and certification of cattle and the herds
from which they came as being free of Bang's disease. And in the Missouri
Pacific case a state was permitted to regulate local switching, although the
Interstate Commerce Commission might have prescribed regulations as to this
matter. The Court did attempt to distinguish the Mintz case on the ground
that the federal statute provided that in case of federal inspection of livestock
no further inspection could be required. The Court inferred that Congress
intended that the states might require inspection in the absence of federal inspection. If the test to determine Congress' intent as to the supersedure of state
15

Occasionally some reliance is had on Committee Reports, as in Northern Pacific
Ry. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 32 S. Ct. 160 (1912).
7
Oregon-Washington R. R. & Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87,
46 S. Ct. 279 (1926).
8
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 272 U. S. 605, 47 S. Ct. 207 (1926).
9
37 Stat. L. 318, as amended by 39 Stat. L. 1165, 7 U.S. C. (1934), § 161.
10
43 Stat. L. 659 (1924), 45 U. S. C. (1934), § 23.
11
Oregon-Washington R. R. & Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87,
46 S. Ct. 279 (1926); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 47 S. Ct. 207
(1926).
12
Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346, 53 S. Ct. 611 (1932).
18
Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U. S. 612, 29 S. Ct.
214 (1909).
14
32 Stat. L. 791, 21 U.S. C. (1934), §§ 111, 120-122.
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regulations by federal regulations were the sweeping scope of the legislation,
certainly the provisions of the Federal Motor Carrier Act are sweeping enough
to satisfy such a test.15 However, the Court did not see fit to adopt this test.
Rather the Court seemed to take the position that the dissenting judges did in the
Oregon-Washington Railroad case,16 i.e., that Congress could not have intended
that the safety of the people of a state depended upon action by a far-away
federal agency. The Court pointed out that some regulation of the highways
is necessary to protect life and limb. Prescription of maximum hours of continuous driving would appear to be within such necessary regulation. For this
reason it is submitted that the result in the instant case is socially desirable. Ancl
in so far as the decision indicates that state regulations providing for the safety
of its people will not be superseded by a mere delegation of authority by Congress,
the decision contributes to certainty in the law.
Fred C. Newman

Cf. 36 M1cH. L. REv. 450 at 452 (1938).
Oregon-Washington R. R. & Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87
at 103, 46 S. Ct. 279 (1926). See Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss, 302 U. S. 1 at
14, 58 S. Ct. 87 (1937).
15

16

